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ABSTRACT 
 
The article takes its point of departure in current suggestions stating that the idea of ‘commons’ 
could be a universal and normative guideline for how to organise a part of the interplay between 
nature and human activity. It is stated, that the concept in contemporary discourses has a 
widespread spectrum of connotations and is engaged for descriptive, prescriptive, and normative 
purposes. The content, character and meaning thus depend on context and dimensions in focus; the 
point is illustrated by means of the historical Danish commons. In a consecutive investigation of 
implicated concepts from social sciences (‘property rights’ being the starting point) it is similarly 
stated that implications cannot be determined ex ante. By means of elements from institutional 
economics and the sociology of space, suggestions for a conceptual framework are presented as 
basis for more detailed studies at a lower level of abstraction. Returned to Danish farming – but 
now in its contemporary settings – it is concluded that the framework of commons not adequately 
can be copied-and-pasted into present context due to the complex interconnectivity where local 
agriculture have boundless prerequisites and effects. 
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 3 
Introduction 
 
The starting and end point is economic dimensions of rural landscape and agriculture as the 
subsequent productive field. The meaning of ‘landscape’ has evolved to cover territory (including 
polity) and scenery (Olwig, 1996). A landscape is “... a historical document containing evidence of 
a long process of interaction between society and its material environs” (Olwig, 2002, p.226). In 
rural landscapes that interaction generally also implies a space of production; in that respect 
landscape is nexus in the present article. Landscape contains land; land is from an economic point 
of view a productive factor and as such part of the capital prerequisites for social production. To 
produce by means of land it is necessary to apply two other productive factors: real capital and 
labour. But land is not only a productive factor; it is also the container of a crucial part of the 
natural resources as well as the space in which critical reproductive processes of nature take place; 
besides, land constitutes social space for human creativity and recreation as well. Thus, landscape 
contains and implies spaces that both represent crucial visible and non-visible elements of the 
natural life support systems (systems that we as human beings must handle sustainable to maintain 
human life (Levin, 2009)). Landscape also represents conflicts of human interests related to scarce 
productive and reproductive resources which is reflected in contemporary discourses by terms like 
‘post-industrial landscape’ and ‘multifunctionality’ (Ling et al., 2007, Taff, 2005, Ferrari & 
Rambonilaza, 2008). In this connection ‘commons’ has been introduced as a representative of 
principles that might give cause to sustainable organisation and management of interaction between 
social activity and nature in the landscape. 
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The concept of the commons 
 
The concept ‘commons’ has in the last decades entered academic as well as public debate 
concerning a broad spectrum of problems referring to various biophysical structures like nature, 
landscape and environment, and besides to social parameters like access, property rights and 
administration. The current discourse has its starting point in Hardin’s (1968) famous article 
concerning the ‘tragedy of the commons’ based on analysis that illustrated implications of 
ineffective pay off and natural degradation (in contemporary terms a social trap), contested by 
Ostrom (1990) who stated that Hardin’s point did not comply with general experience, rephrased by 
Hardin (1994) as ‘the tragedy of the unmanaged commons’, and e.g. rephrased as potential ‘comedy 
of the commons’ (Rose, 1994). The appertaining academic efforts have led to a remarkable amount 
of conceptual and contextual suggestions and applications occasionally referred to as ‘new 
commons’ (Bravo & Moor, 2008). In Danish, the corresponding concept is ‘fælled’ which until 
recently exclusively described a piece of grassland where the tenants in the époque of feudalism 
were able to make their cattle graze while the concept close to it ‘fælles’ has been reserved to 
describe what is common in the sense of mutual and shared. However, in current international 
discourses, the major part of the contributions does not refer to common grassland. When citizens 
e.g. are urged to ‘reclaim the commons’ (Anonymous, 1993, Barnes, 2006) it does not imply that 
my neighbours and I according to the senders of the imperative should establish common pasture 
for our cows (of which we have none so ever). It is rather suggestions concerning common access, 
organisation/administration, and/or mutual ownership of certain assets. Although contemporary 
discourse is based upon a variety of interesting and important academic findings, and although a 
comprehensive part of these findings have been acknowledged with the Nobel Prize to the key 
founding mother of the nuanced part of the discourse, Elinor Ostrom, at the end of the day we are 5 
still dealing with a diffuse and blurred concept due to applications in a very broad variety of 
contexts where emphasis is put on a similarly broad spectrum of dimensions. The concept is e.g. 
used to describe and explain technology and social structures in feudal systems (Clark, 1998), it is 
used to describe the internet plus information and intellectual property rights (Hess & Ostrom, 
2007, Lessig, 2003) and also spirituality (McWilliam, 2009), it is used to describe public presence 
in rural space (Mitchell, 2008), it is used as basis to urge for a movement to roll back market 
enclosure of common life (Bollier, 2003) and further to describe principle foundations for a renewal 
of the capitalist system as “capitalism 3.0” (Barnes, 2006). In such connections a very broad 
variety of different dimensions are engaged by different scholars; some e.g. underline the property 
right dimension (‘common/shared property’), some stress dimensions concerning organisation and 
administration (‘common coercion’), some draw attention to dimensions related to open access 
(‘publicness’) while others again delimit focus to interrelations between human actions and nature 
as aesthetic form and/or as natural life support systems. Hence, the concept is no longer reserved to 
inclusively refer to the ‘fælled’ but does in contemporary use cover a tremendous variety of 
connotations where the concept is engaged to underline descriptive, prescriptive as well as 
normative objectives. As it presumably would be a Sisyphean task to ‘reclaim the commons’ in the 
sense of rolling it back to recapture its original reference, it is actually necessary to realise that a 
variety of different meanings are currently embedded. Content, character and meaning of the 
concept vary depending upon context and supplementary on dimensions in focus; subsequently it is 
necessary to be careful, specific and explicit in the determination of context and dimensions when 
the concept and corresponding conceptual frameworks are engaged. Nowadays the concept per se is 
so imprecise that it appears empty and meaningless without such specifications. 
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The ‘fælled’, context and dimensions 
 
The original meaning of the Danish concept ‘fælled’ refers to farming in the feudal époque. The 
appertaining peasant society could be characterised as a system based on centralised property rights 
concentrated among the landed proprietors plus the crown and the church. However, the system also 
implied broad user rights for tenants gathered in what could be labelled as a peasant communitarian 
organisation. User rights implied the right to farm but e.g. also access and hunting. The communal 
system of agriculture implied that peasants and smallholders (including their families and hired 
hands) were gathered in village communities with a high degree of local ability to mutually 
administer local matters; an organisational structure based on rather specific institutions that to a 
certain degree aimed to ensure that the common good were pursued. Copyholders and smallholders 
with access to land participated in the village meeting and amongst them a master of guild was 
elected for a one year period. In the village meetings, the participants agreed upon a broad variety 
of practical problems concerning common decisions regarding current and long term planned 
farming practice, disagreements, crimes, domestic problems, etc. This organisational mode should 
be understood in relation to the general feudal system, including the economic subsystem and the 
agricultural technology of that time. The economy, especially in the villages, was dominated by 
barter (Madsen, 2007). 
‘Fælled’ was grassland within and around the peasant community, i.e., it was enclosed 
fields in periods where fallowed and it was outskirt like heat land, wasteland, pasture, meadow, 
marsh, etc. The ‘fælled’ was a crucial factor of agricultural production due to the necessity to make 
use of pasture for animals especially in the summer. The agricultural usage and social function of 
the ‘fælled’ were subject to a complex and delicate system of administration and regulation based 
on well-established institutions. The general everyday tasks attached to pasturing and management 7 
of the animals were put in the hands of the local village herdsman while the superintendence was 
put in hands of a bailiff elected by several villages in unity. And as the ‘fælled’ was part of the 
agricultural production system of the village, decisions concerning usage were taken in the village 
meeting as part of the general social organisational decision-making and planning system. The 
village community was to a high degree constituted so that the agricultural production was the 
concentric anchor point for joint decisions and actions based on plans carried by the village 
meeting. This fact did also embrace the commons which in turn also implied that the village 
meeting jointly kept order on the commons; this included supervision to avoid inadequate usage and 
exhaustion of the land e.g. due to over-grazing. Further, the Danish king stated by law in 1683 that 
the carrying capacity of the commons should be estimated as a precautionary measure against over-
grazing. Accordingly, assessment officers were appointed to carry out the task attached to a more 
centralised supervision. (Madsen, 2007, Bjørn, 1995, Bjørn, Fonnesbech-Wulff & Frandsen, 2000, 
Porsmose & Bjørn, 1997, Fritzbøger, 2004) 
The brief sketch above should indicate that the ‘fælled’ indeed was not an expression 
of anarchy, not in any sense part of an unregulated system where productive use and aggregated 
outcome were assigned to atomistic and segregated decisions and it was neither a system based 
exclusively upon hegemonic power. On the contrary, the system should be characterised as part of a 
specific and complex  institutional arrangement that aimed at maintaining balances between central 
authority, local and regional authority and the relatively autonomic joint organisation of the villages 
which also embraced joint supervision and care for the commons. However, this institutional 
arrangement did not last forever but was transformed into a new one. Powerful actors wanted 
changes and advocated the need by referring to a notion of the feudal farming system as ineffective. 
This was a notion that was fostered in England and exported to the continent (Clark, 1998). 8 
The feudal system was transformed and as a part of the transformation, new farming 
technology was introduced which implied the necessity to make fundamental reconstructions of the 
institutional arrangement including transformation of the barter economy into a pecuniary economic 
subsystem. It is here crucial to underline the specific context and subsequent dimensions of the 
concept of the ‘fælled’. It can only get content, character and meaning in relation to that specific 
context including specific societal structure, technology and the specific economic subsystem to a 
high degree bounded to the place.  
 
  
 
 
Key economic concepts related to the commons 
 
Both in current academic discourses and in investigations where more historical perspectives have 
been engaged, essential elements have – implicitly or explicitly – been obtained from the economic 
construct. However, to reveal the potential dimensions and perspectives these concepts might offer 
– and immanently imply – it is necessary as a starting point to investigate their basic content, 
character and meaning. 
Property rights are an often implicit, but nonetheless crucial, institutional prerequisite 
in economic reasoning. The background is that economic exchange has two preconditions. First, the 
substantial: establishment of a relation between buyer and seller imply that the former will receive 
utility by means of the good to be exchanged and the latter conversely does not need the good but is 
able to obtain utility due to what he receives in the act of exchange (be it pecuniary, tangible goods, 
or services). Second, the social precondition is that the seller is able to achieve right to make certain 9 
decisions concerning the good, including the formal and informal ability to decide whether to divest 
or not, in combination with means to maintain exclusivity; the latter precondition being crucial due 
to the fact that in case of non-exclusivity the buyer would not have to enter a relation of exchange. 
This is where property rights enter the picture; the social surroundings have to ensure mutual 
recognition of the opportunities of execution of decisive power and exclusivity, where society 
ensures the necessary opportunities by means of formal and/or informal institutions which in turn 
are parts of a general social institutional arrangement. (Lundkvist, 2004) 
However, property rights are not paramount and do not in the real world necessarily 
imply unlimited power to the holder of the title to exclude other actors from utilities emanating 
from the property. This is where user rights enter the picture. User rights imply that a finite or 
infinite number of actors have the right to make use of a good notwithstanding the fact that they do 
not posses property rights. The farmers e.g. in the Danish feudal system as sketched above did not 
hold property rights to the land; they were tenants and subsequently held user rights. In the present 
time one could make an analogy to rent and lease arrangements where the property rights are 
maintained by the vendor but user rights for a fixed term are transferred to the consumer. User 
rights/access to private roads can similarly provide an illustration of both historical and 
contemporary significance.  Property rights do not necessarily equal user rights; the relation 
between the two are set, maintained, and evolved according to a specific institutional arrangement 
only to be revealed in the specific context. 
The distinction between public and private property is in principle inappropriate 
because exclusivity is embedded in the very concept of ‘private’ while it simultaneously contains no 
determination of who should hold the right to exclude – that right can be held by an individual or a 
group of individuals, even a nation (Lundkvist, 2004). However, the academic use of the term 
makes it adequate to maintain a distinction where ‘private property’ refers to individuals and groups 10 
in the economic sphere and ‘public property’ to the political sphere. In other words, public property 
will in this connection imply that the property rights are held by political authorities (in a wide 
sense) subsequently able to execute decisive power and exclusion in line with Easton’s (1965) 
concept of authoritative allocation. Defining private property (in the sense the concept is typically 
used) is, however, much more difficult in a positive sense. Several classic as well as contemporary 
economists have underlined private property as constituted by its individuality but in the real world 
private property will often imply that several individuals share joint property rights to an asset. 
Defined negatively – which indeed is more plain – private property is such that cannot be 
characterised as public which in turn imply that the decisive power related to alienation and 
exclusivity is not in the hands of public authorities. Private property can thus take many forms and 
be attached to individuals as well as groups and subsequently the concept does not contain rather 
much information but should be determined specifically in relation to context. In immediate 
continuation of the individual foundation of the major part of economics, the mainstream part of the 
branch tends to neglect various forms of non-public property, i.e. various forms of organising 
collective/mutual ownership outside the economic and political sphere (Mitchell, 2008) and thus 
only focus on ownership attached to the market in traditional sense; either as individual property or 
as shared property by means of capital markets; however, mainstream economic scholars have 
recently showed increasing attention to the concept ‘club-goods’ (in continuation of Buchanan 
(1965)),  often approached by means of game theory (Scotchmer, 2008).  
The distinction between public and private goods and tasks are tricky too due to the 
fact that it is difficult to distinctly decide what should be public and what should be private. In 
standard economics, public goods are such that would not (or not adequately or in sufficient 
quantities) be provided if provision was left to private producers because at the bottom line it would 
be unprofitable for private actors to produce them (Musgrave, 1969, Buchanan & Musgrave, 1999, 11 
Samuelson, 1973). Subsequently private goods are those provided by agents participating in regular 
markets.  
A way to consider the latter distinction more explicitly to nature and landscape could 
be by way of Roman law. Here property was divided into four different categories. Res publica 
implied that property rights were held by government to benefit the public. Res communes 
characterised goods (such as air and light) where it is impossible to claim and maintain exclusivity. 
Res nullius covered goods like e.g. fish where no one had claimed property rights but once a person 
or group of persons had taken such goods into possession they were considered res private like any 
good (except res publica) to which property rights were attached (Buck, 2003). From these four 
categories it is possible to extract two crucial dimensions: exclusivity and subtractability. 
‘Exclusivity’ is, as stated above, necessary to meaningfully establish property rights – it will give 
no meaning for me to claim property rights over a good if it is impossible or very costly relatively 
to the value of the good to exclude others from utilisation. The second crucial dimension, 
‘subtractability’, refers to the degree in which my use of the good subtracts the utility left to others 
to enjoy. Based on these two dimensions it is suggested that common pool resources should be 
defined as “… subtractable resources managed under a property regime in which a legally defined 
user pool cannot be efficiently excluded from the resource domain” (Buck, 2003, p.5).  
With the reference to Roman Law and the cited definition of ‘common pool resources’ 
we are moving out of the mere abstract considerations attached to pure economics. ‘Property 
regime’ and ‘legal definition’ necessarily refer to social institutions indeed not exclusively attached 
to the economic/market domain.  On the contrary we are dealing with concepts that presume rules 
of the game prior to inclusion of the market. Some have to create the rules, some to administer them 
and make records, some to empower the actors to conduct according to the rules, some to judge in 12 
case of dispute and violation, etc. In other words, institutions like government, public 
administration, cadastre, judicial system, etc. are presumed.  
 
 
 
The economic concepts applied in social context 
 
From the abstract economic concepts above, it is impossible to deduce real world links and 
implications. While economics due to its evolutionary history has its origin in the market as a social 
institution, it subsequently tends to treat other allocation institutions exogenously or even totally 
neglect their existence or inevitable function; further, contemporary mainstream economics can be 
characterised as being of asocial and ahistorical nature (Milonakis & Fine, 2009) based on ceteris 
paribus restrictions which does not realistically comply to a world where context matters. However, 
the brief review above already indicates that more specific considerations concerning institutional 
arrangements are necessary; and moreover it is necessary not to delimit considerations exclusively 
to those imbedded in the marketplace.  
Nonetheless, the key economic concepts and their theoretical framework represent 
important deductive and axiomatic considerations related to market economies. When implemented 
in the real world, the concepts represent institutions concerned with how to make the economy 
work, based on which conditions (including interrelations to and interplay with politics and civil 
society). Institutions are not exogenously given, they are socially established and they evolve. This 
is also the case concerning the institution of property rights and its subsequent implementation e.g. 
in relation to cadastre (Stubkjaer, 1992, Silva & Stubkjaer, 2002). 13 
When we study property rights at a lower level of abstraction it is necessary to 
investigate their extent at least related to the degree of subsequent exclusivity, delimitation of 
proprietors’ room for manoeuvre, and frames – as well as demand – for management. These points 
can be illustrated by means of a comparative study where hunting was the object of research.  Based 
on a law passed in 1964, the French government has forced farmers to make over their hunting right 
to a local association where every farmer should be enrolled as a member. The main purpose of the 
association is to manage the stock of game. As compensation, the farmers receive the right to shoot 
on all land covered by the association. In Portugal, however, the res nullius principle from Roman 
law has been in charge which implies a separation of the ownership to land and the ownership to a 
part of the potential yield, in casu game that is seen as non-property until captured and hereafter as 
property belonging to the hunter. Still, government demand annual exploitation and management 
plans provided by a common organisation for a delimited geographical area and to be approved by 
the governmental hunting agency each year. In Denmark the right to the yield consisting of game 
belongs to the landowner who can keep the hunt for himself or lease it to other hunters; in other 
words, hunting is thus commercial but restricted by governmental regulation especially consisting 
of hunting periods based on national population inventory schemes (Carolino et al., Forthcoming).  
The illustration from the field of hunting underlines that property rights do not imply 
any specificity in at least two fields: management and initial allocation. First, as e.g. stated in 
relation to another field, groundwater resources “… the relevant question for economists is not 
whether to manage the groundwater resource, but how to manage it; the meaningful point of 
comparison is not between central control and no control, but rather between central control and 
other forms of groundwater management” (Provencher & Burt, 1994, p.876). And, one can add it 
should now appear as evident that resources can be managed adequately without the use of private 
property rights or centralised regulation (Eldridge, 2009, Manning, 2008, Agrawal, 2003).  Second, 14 
private property rights regimes require initial distribution of the stock (e.g. land) to which property 
rights are attached and schemes concerning how flow/yield are allocated and how rights and 
obligations attached should be distributed. Furthermore, both management and schemes concerning 
flow and yield must evolve depending on social, economic, and technological development to avoid 
potential damage to ecosystems (Dietz et al., 2003); it is obvious to add, that such schemes in 
general should deal with externalities. Management and schemes simultaneously have to comply 
with social arrangements that in turn have to evolve according to context as well as to current public 
perceptions to ensure general public acceptance.  
Finally, the illustration also underlines the necessity to specify the concepts of ‘public 
goods’ and ‘public access’. Kaul et al. (1999) have in general terms contested the mainstream 
economic interpretation of the concept of ‘public goods’. First, it is not given which goods are 
public and which private; the distinction has to be an outcome based on political choice. Second 
public goods are not necessarily useful to everyone or anyone and it is neither certain that all social 
segments might make use of it. Third, a public good is not necessarily provided by the state 
(Conceição et al., 2003, Kaul & Conceição, 2006). Further, government can have property rights to 
private goods, produce them and bring them to the market; hence, government can act as any 
economic agent as well as invite private agents to procure public goods. Establishing property rights 
does neither imply any specific degree of inclusion/exclusion or “publicness” (Mitchell, 2008, 
Baland & Platteau, 1996) according to access or according to user rights (including rights to claim 
output/goods originated from capital such as land).  
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Societal fields 
 
Economics is about allocation but allocation is not exclusively decided at the marketplace. As 
indicated in the preceding considerations, allocation of goods and rights is a result of complex 
decisions and actions based on various manifestations of social action. This complex was an 
important field of research for the institutional economist J.R. Commons (1862-1945) based on his 
studies of contemporary US society. The subsequent theoretical corpus is build upon three main 
factors: scarcity, conflict of interests and collective action. He envisages property rights as key to 
conflict of interests, because property rights distribute access to and command over scarce resources 
but also point at collective action as the basis for holding the conflicts of interests in check. Thus, 
J.R. Commons substituted the invisible hand of Adam Smith (1723-1790) with the visible hand of 
common-law courts (Chavance, 2009). Collective action and institutional structure “… mould and 
shape individual thought and action” (Milonakis & Fine, 2009, p.177) and hence create a delicate 
balance between individual and shared interest as well as stability and evolution.  ‘Collective 
action’ can be unorganised (custom) or organised (going concern). In his further investigations, J.R. 
Commons stresses that individuals belong to several different organisations and he divides them 
into three main categories: economic, political and cultural (Chavance, 2009). 
The insights from J.R. Commons apply to the present context that collective actions 
establish and evolve societies, that collective actions can be custom or going concern and finally 
that collective actions simultaneously take places in different fields. In other words, as social actors 
we are participants in various manifestations of collective action performed at different social 
arenas or fields, cf. Bourdieu & Wacquant (1992). These fields might be classified as 1) the 
economic, 2) the political, and 3) the field of civil society where each is based on a specific 
rationality and the function of each field depends on specific mechanisms.  16 
The various fields thus offer different opportunities based on different rules of the 
game. And moreover, the specific rules of the game – and so specific opportunities offered social 
actors in the social fields – rest on context, i.e. the specific institutional setup in the specific time 
and space. The diversity also implies that the fields contain different systems to allocate matter, 
value, power and esteem among the social actors. At the economic field the actors organise 
production and reproduction as producers and consumers, employers and employees. At this field 
businesses and households are typical organisational units. At the political field the actors organise 
decisions and administration of common and public social interests. Constituency, decision-making 
institutions and public administration are thus typical organisational units. At the field of civil 
society families, neighbourhood, and associations are the typical, organisational units. When 
considered as allocation systems, none of the social fields are from a formal point of view perfect 
but bounded by their different rationalities and context. However, in unity they are able to balance 
the total social system, cf. Hernes (1978, 1985).  
A first step to approach a real world determination of balance in and among social 
fields is possible by means of the ideal type concepts of Liberal Market Economies (LME) and 
Coordinated Market Economies (CME) (Katzenstein, 1985, Hall & Soskice, 2001). When this 
framework is connected to the concepts of social fields, it will become clear that the specific 
balance reveals how authority and social tasks are divided among them. In LME’s the balance tends 
to give high priority to the market and less to the political field; i.e., let the market take care of most 
current tasks and leave to the political field primarily to provide overall frames for the market and 
to supply frames and services that help the market function properly, e.g. minimise transactions 
costs (Williamson, 1994) and compensate for diseconomies like negative external effects (Coase, 
1960). In CME’s the balance is different while the division of tasks between the three fields is more 
even and flexible. Thus, by means of determining the balance between the fields and the 17 
subsequently division of authority and social tasks it is possible to provide the foundation to decide 
the ideal typical institutional arrangement of a society. 
However, the LME/CME dichotomy is only a first step heuristic tool. An even more 
detailed specification is necessary to explain and understand how and why social authority and 
social tasks are carried out in a specific social context. Such considerations will reveal important 
variations in time as well as variations amongst economies that fall into one of the two ideal types, 
LME/CME (Elsner & Hanappi, 2008, Hancké et al., 2007). The specific division of tasks and 
authority is the basis for determination of the specific institutional arrangement of a given society 
and thus basis for determination of how landscapes are perceived (Carrier & West, 2009, Barry & 
Smith, 2008), administered, and regulated both as biophysical units and social constructions, how 
property and user rights are distributed and actions for individuals and groups are bounded, etc. In 
other words, the specific institutional arrangement concerning balance and division of tasks and 
authority amongst the societal fields is a foundation for contextual meaning, content in, and 
relations between, the standard economic concepts. The specific context of the Danish historical 
‘fælled’, and thus the balance between the division of authority and tasks between societal fields of 
that time, is a prerequisite to explain and understand how and why that specific common good 
functioned. Correspondingly context is a prerequisite to explain and understand the various 
supplementary real world examples presented above. 
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Institutions – guidelines in the fields 
 
The societal fields are related and interrelated and are functioning on the basis of a certain 
rationality embedded in institutions as parts of an institutional arrangement. Based on the widely 
accepted definition offered by North (1990), institutions can be defined as: 
 
“Institutions are the rules of the game in a society or, more formally, are the humanly 
devised constraints that shape human interaction. In consequence they structure incentives in 
human exchange, whether political, social, or economic. Institutional change shapes the way 
societies evolve through time and hence is the key to understanding historical change”. (North, 
1990, p.3) 
 
Thus, institutions can be perceived as mutually accepted guidelines for human action. 
They contain information about what is seen as adequate and appropriate interpretation of, and 
responses to, the surroundings, – social, mental and biophysical. They subsequently contain 
information about what specific rationality a certain group (nation, social class, community, 
association, family, etc.) of humans has established their relations upon.  It follows then that there 
are various sets of institutions (e.g. in a nation) coexisting with various subsets (e.g. various local 
regions and communities) that are interconnected and to a certain degree compatible and 
complementary but not identical. 
This picture of institutions also complies with the various societal fields introduced 
above. These fields contain various sets of institutions not necessarily identical but to a certain 
degree compatible and often to a very high degree complementary. Institutions in – and hence 
embedded rationality of – civil society will typically differ from those in economic and political 19 
fields. That is one key raison d’être for the variety of social fields; they can supplement and 
substitute each other giving basis for various actions and reactions based upon different 
rationalities. When for instance the outcome based on the mechanisms of markets is undesirable 
and/or perceived as inadequate (e.g. distribution of income or damage to nature and environment), 
actions in the political field can compensate (e.g. by means of the tax-system compensate families 
left in income squeeze and by means of regulation minimise or compensate pollution) or civil 
society might compensate (e.g. help from neighbours and charity organisations, or nature 
restoration initiated by nature conservation societies).  
In general, the construction of human relations implies that productive and 
reproductive activities take place in the various fields; which activities that take place where and 
how, is guided by means of institutions.  
 
 
 
Context revisited – the concept of space 
 
In the preceding contemplations context is crucial to establish specific content, character and 
meaning of social concepts and problems. In general, context is a matter of when and where. 
‘When’ refers to determination of concepts and problems in historical time and ‘where’ refers to 
determination of position in space.  
Space is conceptually used in a very broad spectrum of contexts (Kitchin et al., 2004, 
Crang & Thrift, 2000). Thinking concerning the concept of space might well be seen as an 
expression of our general human and analytical need to be able to place anything somewhere where 
we are able to make delimitations and subsequently by way of placement obtain the insight that 20 
provide meaning to things. ‘Things’ are thus matter and processes and subsequently both tangible 
and intangible; following this line, spaces have to be distinguished as physical in some connections 
and as imaginary in others. The origin of the concept has been empirico-physical implying space 
considered as outside humans and thus something absolute and objective “… space and place are 
often regarded as synonymous with terms including region, area and landscape” (Kitchin et al., 
2004, p.3). In recent decades this perception has been contested and space has become ‘the 
everywhere of modern thought’ (Holloway et al., 2003) and occurs as starting point for many 
intellectual disputes. However, – just as pointed out concerning the concept of commons – content, 
character and meaning are depending upon context (so we are also depending upon context of 
context) and clarification of the specific dimensions thus have to be considered.  
However, current conceptions seem to reach a complex and nuanced consideration 
that is able to include absolute dimensions too. One can for instance state that landscape is at place 
in a place. It is imperative to remember that landscape consists of soil, rocks, vegetation, and 
biological creatures but as soon as we employ concepts like ‘commons’ to the place it is also turned 
into a social construction. The place is thus a social construction of human relations and human 
reconstruction of biophysical structures.  
The concept of space involves both material and immaterial dimensions and hence 
implications of physical delimitation or boundaries attached to a specific substance or activity. 
Thus, we can initially distinguish two different categories of demarcation: boundaries in biophysical 
sense (e.g. watersheds) and delimitations induced by human cognition cf. (Smith, 1995). In the first 
sense space can objectively be revealed (e.g. by means of GIS), but in the second, boundaries must 
be negotiated and hence potentially be object for continuous renegotiation. Castells (2000, 2002) 
provides a valuable and adequate contribution in the context of the present discussion of landscape, 
nature and social interaction. Castells has suggested distinctions between ‘space of place’ and 21 
‘space of flows’ especially meant for his investigations of new economy in the information age. 
Castells is thus preoccupied with networks, how they are organised and the actors are located. In the 
present context it seems adequate to set ‘space of place’ as the area that geographically can be 
demarcated in absolute terms while ‘space of flows’ should consist of two types of spaces: one type 
for material flows and another for immaterial flows, the first subgroup being tangibles (i.e. matter 
and in the social form e.g. commodities and pollution) and the latter being intangibles (in the social 
form e.g. information, ideas, and financial capital). Hence, space is simultaneously tangible and 
intangible.  
 
 
Context, institutions and landscape 
 
The peasant farmers around the Danish ‘fælled’ were part of an institutional arrangement and they 
were employing a certain technology. This in turn affected the rural landscape (Fritzbøger, 2004, 
Bruun & Fritzbøger, 1999, Hjorth et al., 2002) and gave it a specific appearance. In the feudal 
setting of Rural Denmark, social interplay as well as human interplay with natural life support 
systems was to a high degree attached to the local place. These processes did not involve distant 
time-space relations in either aspect. In that regard, space of flows and space of place was very 
closely intertwined. 
The transformation away from the feudal mode of production implied a new 
institutional arrangement where individual property rights became more essential while importance 
of user rights and collective action conversely diminished; further, new technology was introduced 
once again. The overall implications could be observed in the landscape as new and altered artefacts 
in consequence of the abandonment of peasant village communities and subsequent relocation of 22 
farms and increasing enclosure where the ‘fælled’ as common pasture and organisational principle 
gradually disappeared. The transformation hence affected societal fields too and untied the past 
intertwining of spaces of flows and space of place.  
A new transformation followed from around 1880. New institutional arrangements 
and technological shifts could be observed along with new business strategies focusing on animal 
production and international marketing of processed food (Bjørn, 1982). Co-operatives were 
introduced as a new mode of collective action based on deliberative competences acquired in 
continuation of the specific Danish Enlightenment project, and with traces back to institutions from 
the village communities (Ingemann, 2002). Similarly, rural actors and their intellectual supporters 
founded private organisations (parcel out associations) to provide farmland for smallholders with 
lack of sufficient land to provide for themselves and their families according to the productive and 
reproductive conditions of that time (Skrubbeltrang, 1952, Ingemann, 1997). Again, transformation 
could be traced in specific landscapes as well as societal fields and spaces of flows. 
Ensuing transformations and changes occurred during history till present times; 
among important milestones are industrial farming technology and at the latest supplementary and 
substitute organic technology. Transformations and changes can be tracked in the landscape. This is 
also the case regarding societal fields where agro-industrial and agro-political complexes evolved 
(Ingemann, 2002, 1999). The industrial farming technology implied that global flows became 
crucial and constituting prerequisites for modern agriculture; production evolved to create a ‘new 
space of production’ by utilising and combining a broad variety of places and flows. Although 
institutional arrangements have changed, memories are present and it is possible to reveal a 
trajectory with specific genetic origin in the feudal peasant system – or even before. Institutions 
have evolved and been adapted according to changing contexts but in line with – and according to – 
the origin, experiences acquired, and subsequent changes in social and natural settings. When, for 23 
example, organic farming was institutionalised in Denmark 1987, the organic farmers did what 
Danish farmers have done for more than a century: they called upon government and activated the 
specific mix of actions in the fields of economy, politics, and civil society (Ingemann, 2006). In 
consequence, organic farmers obtained governmental certification and subsidy schemes as their 
conventional colleagues did more than100 years earlier. Danish organic farmers’ ability to manifest 
collective action and to connect to contemporary spatial flows in their trials to establish businesses, 
is one of the important factors behind the relatively high market share of organic food in Denmark 
(Kjeldsen & Ingemann, 2009, 2006) 
Although it is obvious to recover genetic traces of former institutions in contemporary 
actions and reactions, major differences occur too. When comparing the Danish peasant farmer in 
the feudal époque with the contemporary industrial pig producer, differences seem overwhelming. 
The institutional arrangements are radically altered; the meaning as well as implications of space is 
radically different too. The peasants acted in a place where the organisational and power-related 
interrelations (as well as flows) to a very high degree where clear and transparent and for the major 
part attached to the place. The contemporary industrial farmer is a pawn in an inscrutable agro-
industrial and agro-political complex (going concerns) that reaches far outside the place occupied 
for his agricultural production: fodder being imported as soy-beans from South America and tapioca 
from South East Asia, fertilisers and chemicals from a huge amount of places, etc. and subsequently 
external effects, besides financial relations around the globe. To establish the contemporary spaces 
of flows in which the industrial farmer consciously and unconsciously takes part, will implicate a 
careful and detailed track-and-trace investigation of great extent. Contemporary spaces of flows in 
which the industrial farmer takes part, indicate that he indirectly occupies and affects spaces of 
places not known to him and without specific incentives to care. 24 
When rural landscape of the era of the ‘fælled’ is compared to contemporary rural 
landscape in the attempt to investigate meaning and potentiality of the concept of commons, two 
points strike the eye. First, in the former era the space of production was almost totally delimited to 
the place. That unambiguousness is in the contemporary context superseded by a space of 
production consisting of a complex network of places linked by means of ambiguous flows. Second, 
in the former era the unambiguous space of production and the community coincided; i.e. collective 
action in the fields of economy, politics, and civil society was unified and attached to the place. In 
contemporary context this attachment to the place and convergence of actions in the societal fields 
are superseded by hyper complexity and diffusion. Thus, the contemporary rural landscape in 
Denmark is no longer just a reflection of the place of production and local community but of a 
complex space of production in a global economic system. However, Danish farmers have not lost 
their institutionalised ability to engage in collective action but contemporary actions have assumed 
new dimensions due to altered context where the hegemony of place has disappeared. As the 
meaning and function of the ‘fælled’ where attached to the place, it seems inadequate – and even 
impossible – to reinstate principles of commons in that sense. Collective action might be necessary 
to meet contemporary challenges attached to the productive and reproductive interplay between 
man and nature but it should subsequently be in dimensions compatible to present context.  
 
 
Conclusions  
 
There is a link between sustainability in the biophysical and social sense. Biophysical sustainability 
implies that the social institutions are able to address the biophysical challenges in a sustainable 
way and to manage these challenges, institutional sustainability is a prerequisite. However, this 25 
claim does not imply institutional rigidity; on the contrary, it implies the necessity of institutional 
evolutionary capacity and deliberative competences among the social actors. When biophysical 
conditions change (e.g. in reaction to human social actions), social institutions have to change too in 
response if both the biophysical as well as the social systems are to be sustained.  
The brief sketch of the ‘fælled’ compared to the framework presented in the present 
article suggest that interrelations between the societal fields are decisive in determination of how 
ownership, property rights, user rights, regulation, administration, etc., are distributed. The 
interrelations across the fields establish various forms of connections and interdependence that 
results in certain institutional arrangements that in turn determine various rules of the games; this 
also includes rules of the game concerning interplay with biophysical structures and thus basis for 
determining the degree of sustainability as well as appearance of rural landscape. 
From a social point of view the ‘fælled’ was indeed not an expression of anarchy, it 
was not in any sense part of an unregulated system where productive usage and aggregated outcome 
were assigned to atomistic and segregated decisions and it was neither a system based exclusively 
upon hegemonic power. On the contrary, the system should be characterised as part of a specific 
and complex institutional arrangement that aimed at maintaining balances between central 
authority, local and regional authority and the relatively autonomic joint organisation of the villages 
which also embraced joint supervision and care for the commons, i.e. space of production. 
However, this point does certainly not imply that we are able to copy and paste such a kind of 
institutional arrangement to the present and hence neither to restore rural landscape as it appeared in 
the era of the ‘fælled’.  
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